The co-evolution of organizational value capture, value creation and sustainable advantage by Pitelis, Christos
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The co-evolution of organizational value
capture, value creation and sustainable
advantage
Christos Pitelis
October 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23937/
MPRA Paper No. 23937, posted 26. July 2010 11:08 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441201
 1 
The Co-Evolution of Organizational Value Capture, Value Creation and 
Sustainable Advantage* 
 
 
 
Christos N. Pitelis  
Judge Business School and Queens’ College 
University of Cambridge 
Trumpington Street 
Cambridge 
CB2 1AG 
UK 
Tel: 0044 1223 339618 
Fax: 0044 1223 766815 
Email: c.pitelis@jbs.cam.ac.uk 
 
 
Keywords: Value Creation, Value Capture, Sustainable Advantage, Co-evolution 
 
*We are grateful to John Dunning, Martin Kilduff, Joe Mahoney, Anita McGahan, Pellumb 
Kelmendi, Bart Nooteboom, David Teece, three anonymous reviewers and the former 
Editor in Chief of this Journal, Hari Tsoukas, as well as participants at conferences and 
seminars where earlier versions of the paper were presented, (notably at ALBA, SOAS, 
Copenhagen Business School and the ENEF Workshop in Pisa, September 2008), for 
comments and discussion. Errors are ours. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441201
 2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite recent emphasis on intra-organizational issues, scholarship on organizations, 
management and strategy remains unduly reliant on economic models, such as the 
industrial organization (IO) market structure-based analysis. The focus of such models is on 
price-output determination by firms and the economy-wide efficient allocation of scarce 
resources under conditions of full knowledge and certainty. This limits their usefulness for 
students of organizations who have concerns that are simultaneously wider and also 
focused on organizations, as opposed to just markets. In this paper, we aim to provide an 
answer and framework for analysing the most fundamental, indeed existential, issue of 
organization studies and strategic management scholarship. This is whether and how the 
pursuit of value capture from economic agents who perceive that they possess appropriable 
value creating advantages, capabilities and action potential, can motivate the emergence of 
organizations and  their strategies and actions intended to capture  socially co-created value 
in conditions of real life .  To do so, we explore (the co-evolution of) value capture and 
creation and (their relationship to) organizational sustainable advantage (SA). In particular, 
we delve into the nature, determinants and relationship between organizational value 
capture and creation and explore causal pathways, trade-offs and their co-evolution, as well 
as vehicles through which SA can be effected in an evolving and uncertain environment. 
We also discuss implications for managerial practice, limitations and future research 
opportunities.  
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    I. Introduction  
 
          The aim of this paper is to provide a framework and answer to the most important, 
indeed existential, concern of organization studies (OS) and strategic management 
scholarship. This is whether and how the pursuit of value capture by economic agents who 
perceive that they possess advantages, capabilities and action potential that can help them 
create appropriable value, can inform the question of the emergence of organizations as 
well as their strategies and actions to capture as much as possible out of the overall value 
they and others co-create, in a sustainable way and under real life conditions and 
behaviours. 
 The creation of value and the pursuit of sustainable advantage (SA) are widely 
regarded as two critical concerns of strategic management and organization scholarship 
(Collis and Montgomery 1998; Saloner et al. 2001; Ghoshal et al. 2002; MacDonald and 
Ryall 2004; Teece 2007; Lepak et al. 2007). Yet the framework and even the terminology 
employed by students of organizations are often borrowed from the economics of IO, such 
as the market structure-based analysis and its underlying concepts and assumptions 
(Lippman and Rumelt 2003a, b). The main focus of the IO perspective is on price-output 
determination by “firms”, which are seen as no more than points in a cost curve (Penrose 
1959), under  very specific assumptions concerning their objectives, conduct, the structure 
of the industry and the conditions of information and knowledge. The results from the 
analysis of different types of market structures are then used to derive economy-wide 
efficiency implications. Importantly, by assuming profit maximisation under conditions of 
perfect information and certainty, IO scholars can derive exact price-output equilibria and 
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show that under conditions of perfectly competitive market structures, there will be no 
excess (monopoly) profit and the economy-wide outcome will involve the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources (the first “fundamental” theorem of welfare economics). On 
the other hand, imperfect competition will engender monopoly rents, which firms can 
pursue by weakening the forces of competition (Porter 1980). 
Throughout, the focus of IO is on the economic or “opportunity” cost of firms. It is 
assumed that cost and demand conditions are well determined and known to all firms in the 
industry, including potential entrants (Tirole 1988). Importantly, technology and innovation 
are taken to be exogenous to firms (Pitelis and Teece 2009). 
The economics IO focus is simultaneously narrower and broader than that of 
Organization Studies (OS) scholars. Students of organizations pay less attention to 
economy-wide considerations but have a keen interest in intra-organizational issues, which 
are ignored by IO (Coase 1937), not least innovation and strategy for value capture from 
appropriable advantages and actions. In addition, OS focuses on real life organizational 
decision making under real life-informed intra-organizational and environmental 
conditions. Such conditions are normally alien to those assumed by IO, such as perfect 
knowledge and certainty. Moreover while the main focus of IO is on decision making at a 
given point in time, OS is concerned with intertemporal decision making. It is arguable 
therefore that a novel framework that is better suited to the concerns of management and 
OS is required, one that focuses on intertemporal resource and value creation and capture 
through innovation and the pursuit of organizational SA under conditions faced by real life 
organizations.  Despite recent extensive criticisms of the IO-centric concepts of extant OS 
scholarship (Makowski and Ostroy 1995; Lippman and Rumelt 2003), there has been no 
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attempt so far to provide a comprehensive, alternative perspective for OS that addresses its 
main scholarly and methodological interests.   We aim to provide such a framework in this 
paper through an analysis of the nature, determinants, and co-evolution of organizational 
value capture and creation and their relationship to SA under conditions of uncertainty, 
change, limited rationality and learning, as well as anticipatory and pro-active behaviour by 
economic agents.  We claim that despite recent interest and advances on value creation, 
value capture and SA, such a framework is still missing.  
Structure-wise, we first provide an historical account of the nature and theory of 
value in economics, OS and management scholarship and propose a novel, more general 
definition of value (Section II). In section III, we delve into the nature, determinants and 
trade-offs between value creation and capture at the organizational level. Section IV 
discusses the process and causal pathways whereby value is created and captured by 
organizations, as well as the co-genesis, co-determination and co-evolution of value 
creation and capture, their relationship to SA and vehicles through which SA can be 
effected in an uncertain, evolving environment. Section V concludes and discusses 
managerial practice, limitations and directions for future research. 
 
II. The Nature of Organizational Value Creation and Capture 
‘Value’ is an elusive term in social science and management scholarship (Dobb 
1973; Ramirez 1999). The term ‘value added’ is less so. For example Kay (1995) defines 
‘value added’ as “the difference between the (comprehensively accounted) value of a firm’s 
output and the (comprehensively accounted) cost of the firm’s inputs” (1995: 19). He 
regards ‘value added’ as ‘the key measure of corporate success’ (1995: 19).  
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‘Value added’ in the quote above is defined by reference to value, which is not 
defined.  More recently, Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) draw on earlier contributions to 
discuss what is valuable, the types of value (such as ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’) and 
theories of value (for example ‘marginal utility’ and ‘cost of production’), but provide no 
separate definition of ‘value’. Makadok and Coff (2002) critically assess a debate on value 
in the context of the Resource-based View (RBV) between Bowman and Ambrosini (2000),  
Priem (2001) and Priem and Butler (2001a, 2001b), on the one hand and Makadok (2001), 
on the other. They acknowledge that in much of the RBV literature (such as the work of 
Barney 1986; Collis and Montgomery 1995; Peteraf 1993) the focus is on value capture, 
not value creation. They claim that value creation, requires a theory of consumer utility. 
This is absent from the RBV, but present in the marketing literature, and as such of no 
separate concern to RBV scholars.  
A more recent Special Topic Forum of the Academy of Management Review (2007) 
on ‘value creation’ aims to shed more light on value creation and capture. In their 
thoughtful introduction Lepak et al. point out that “value creation is a central concept in the 
management and organization literature” and that value creation is “not well understood” 
(Lepak et al. 2007: 180). They suggest that “value creation depends on the relative amount 
of value that is subjectively realised by a target user (or buyer) who is the focus of value 
creation” (Lepak et al. 2007: 182). They proceed to discuss the process of value creation 
and the mechanisms that allow the creator of value to capture it. The authors provide very 
valuable insights, but take the term “value” as extant and attempt no definition. Even more 
recently, Helfat et al (2007) build on Peteraf and Barney (2003) and define both ‘value’ and 
‘value creation’ as “willingness to pay minus opportunity costs” (pp.12-13 for ‘value 
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creation’ and p.122 for ‘value’ respectively). Their definition aims to account both for 
consumer’s ‘willingness to pay’ and the producer’s economic (opportunity) costs. 
However, it does not distinguish between ‘value’ and ‘value creation’.  
The debate and the difficulties with the notion and theory of ‘value’ are not new -  
they go at least as far back as in the works of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato, 
Aristotle and Xenophon. It assumed renewed interest in the works of classical economists 
such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx and more recently in the works of 
scholars in the ‘marginalist’ tradition of Jevons, Menger and Walras. Maurice Dobb (1973) 
provides an authoritative account of the historical evolution of these debates while more 
recently Ramirez (1999) revisits these from a strategy perspective. Their gist lies in that 
‘classical economists’ considered labour (in Marx’s most developed variant, socially 
necessary labour of average skill and competence) expended in a product, as the sole source 
of ‘value’ (Brown 2008), while the ‘marginalists’ considered marginal utility as the sole 
source of ‘value’ (Dobb 1973: 168). Subsequent developments in the ‘neoclassical’ 
marginalist tradition refer to the ‘theory of value’, as a theory of price determination 
(Robbins 1935; Hicks 1939; Debreu 1959). The celebrated Keynesian economist Joan 
Robinson (1964), for one, considered the notion of ‘value’ as ‘one of the great metaphysical 
ideas in economies’, namely ideological propositions of some content, use, and even 
indispensability, which, however, are outside the realm of science proper (Dobb 1973: 2).  
In economics, IO scholars and texts employ a combination of the cost of production 
and the marginal utility theory, as reflected respectively in the use of an (opportunity) cost 
and a demand schedule. Modern strategy literature also relies on this convention (Peteraf 
and Barney 2003; Helfat et al 2007; Sirmon et al 2007). This is despite the fact that strategy 
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scholars, such as Lippman and Rumelt (2003a,b), question the relevance and even 
definition of the concept of ‘opportunity cost’ and the nature and derivation of a  supply 
curve in neoclassical economics and that marketing scholars, such as Hunt (2000), also 
question the relevance and even existence of a demand curve as a portrayal of consumer 
‘willingness to pay’. Such critiques of extant convention point to the need for a more 
generic definition of value that is immune to them. On the above basis, we propose such a 
definition of ‘value’ as follows: 
 “Value is perceived worthiness of a subject matter to a socio-economic agent that is 
exposed to and/or can make use of the subject matter in question”.  
Perceived worthiness can be due to rarity, aesthetic appeal, a perceived satisfactory 
price for what is on offer (‘value for money’), their combination and/or other attributes of 
the subject matter, perceived by others to be worthy. Advantages of our proposed definition 
include the fact that it does not rely on the idea of ‘willingness to pay’, which presupposes 
the existence of market prices. It also allows for the possibility that some “subject matters” 
can have intrinsic value even when there is no market and/or someone who is willing to pay 
for them (indeed concepts such as ‘decency’ and ‘reliability’ are often defined as ‘values’ 
and our perceptions on these as ‘value systems’, Ramirez 1999). For our purposes in this 
article, in what follows we focus on organizational value, namely on activities, products 
and services engendered by organizations in market economies, which are perceived to be 
worthy by potential beneficiaries, such as consumers, suppliers, or competitors.  The focus 
on all potential beneficiaries also recognises the social dimension of value and value 
creation (Pitelis and Teece 2009). 
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Organizational ‘value’ can be conjectured or realised. Conjectured value is what an 
organization believes it can engender by undertaking a certain action, for example an 
innovation or a transactional activity. Conjectured value becomes realised through sale in 
the market. At the individual level, such as that of a firm, value created is only realised as 
value captured - ontologically value is created and only manifests itself as value captured. 
In this context, producer value creation equals consumer value creation at the point of 
exchange, for the agreed price. Prior to this, however, producer value created is only 
potential and it can well diverge from perceived consumer value (Kim and Mahoney 2002).  
The realisation of value as price raises the issue of consumer awareness and the 
existence of substitute products and competitors – therefore issues of promotion, marketing, 
and competitive strategy. ‘Perceived worthiness’ can be effected through efficiency, 
effectiveness and innovativeness in the production of a good or service that can lead to 
lower cost and price for given characteristics or ‘quality’, or to higher differentiation, 
namely higher perceived quality. In this sense ‘value added’ equals ‘value creation’ and is 
the additional perceived worthiness effected through reduced prices or increased 
differentiation, minus the costs or payments made for the purpose by the agent (such as  the 
producer) who creates value (Lippman and Rumelt 2003a), realised as value captured by 
this economic agent. 
While realised value creation and value captured coincide at the individual level, 
this is not the case at more aggregate levels, such as the industry, the economy or the globe. 
For instance, potential value creation by one agent can be realised as value captured by 
another agent who, for example, is in a better position to capture such value through 
appropriate strategy (Teece 1986). Value creation and value capture need not coincide also 
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because value can be co-created by other economic agents, including competitors, 
suppliers, customers and users (Pitelis and Teece 2009). As such, an organization can 
capture more, the same or less value than the one it helps create. This calls for an 
appreciation of the strategies through which organizations can create and/or capture value 
and their interrelationship (including the possibility of trade-offs) and their impact on 
organizational SA (MacDonald and Ryall 2004; Amit and Shoemaker 1993; Sirmon et al. 
2007).  
In the mainstream IO approach, the canonical value creation/value capture in the 
form of price model is the market structure-based analysis of competition versus monopoly. 
According to this, ‘perfectly competitive’ market structures result in a ‘zero profit’ 
condition, where firms can only cover the economic (or opportunity) cost of their inputs, 
such as capital, labour, management and entrepreneurship. The possibility of capturing 
value as ‘rents’ appears whenever the existence of monopolistic conditions restricts supply, 
and therefore given the demand schedule, it raises prices above those just sufficient to 
cover average costs (see Peteraf and Barney 2003 and Lippman and Rumelt 2003a,b for 
discussions on the nature and types of rents). Given the assumption of exogenously given 
technology and resources-skills, the IO approach is good in showing how value can be 
captured in the form of monopoly rents, given the potential value creation encapsulated by 
the cost and demand curves. Subsequent developments in IO discuss the condition under 
which such ‘rents in equilibrium’ can be effected (Baumol 1982; Tirole 1988), notably the 
existence of barriers to mobility (entry and exit). The absence of barriers to mobility help 
establish the ‘zero waste’ condition (Baumol 1991) and/or the ‘zero profit’ one (Augier and 
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Teece 2008). For the last mentioned, escaping this ‘zero profit’ condition is of essence to 
business strategy. 
The stylised assumptions of IO are not met in practice (Loasby, 1996). In real life, 
costs and demand conditions faced by individual firms may differ, firms may be endowed 
with, or themselves aim to build, heterogeneous skills and capabilities, they can be more or 
less efficient, effective and innovative than their rivals. Such differences, moreover, can be 
attributed and/or reflected in production and/or transaction costs. For example, firms which 
are more efficient, can capture higher profits than their competitors in a sector, even when 
they charge the average market price, when they face lower costs (Demsetz 1973; 
Schumpeter 1942; Williamson 1968). 
 The resurfacing of Coase’s (1937) transaction costs analysis, the elaborations and 
extensions of Coase by Williamson (1975, 1985), and the analysis of their links to property 
rights and the RBV, provide more reasons why large firm size and the concomitant more 
concentrated industry structures, may be seen as the outcome of firm-level capabilities in 
reducing market transaction costs through the internalisation of market transactions (Foss 
and Foss 2005).  
More recently the RBV focused on the nature and determinants of firm 
heterogeneity (Barney 1991; Foss 1993; Mahoney 2005; Peteraf 1993; Peteraf and Barney 
2003; Teece 1982 and Wernerfelt 1984). There are arguably two variants of RBV: the 
‘rents in equilibrium’ and the ‘value creation’ one (Foss 1999).  The former can be seen as 
a complement to the IO literature on barriers to mobility, only now the reason for rents is 
the possession by firms of resources which are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable (VRIN). The ‘value-creation’ variant focuses on the resource-creation 
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potential of firms, through endogenous knowledge, innovation and growth (Penrose 1959). 
Building on Penrose, Richardson (1972) provided an additional production efficiency-based 
reason for the division of labour between markets, firms (integration) and inter-firm 
cooperation, based on the similarity and complementarity of activities (Kay 1998; Foss and 
Loasby 1998). Moreover, Teece (1986) explored conditions under which an innovator 
(such as the music company EMI which first invented the CT scanner), might fail to profit 
from its value creating innovations. He attributed such failures to the lack of strong 
appropriability through patents and/or the possession by firms of complementary skills and 
capabilities vis-à-vis their competitors. This focus on the nature and wider determinants of 
appropriability goes far beyond the IO focus on monopoly rents through barriers to 
mobility and brings the issues of firm-level capabilities and organizational strategy centre-
stage. 
The aforementioned contributions focus on the production-supply-side. However, 
firms can also face (or try to engender) different demand conditions through advertising 
and other sale promotion activities that aim to create new demand and/or to make the 
demand schedule they face less elastic (Scherer and Ross 1990; Penrose 1959). Galbraith 
(1967) went as far as suggesting that the ability and effectiveness of firms to create demand 
is such that one should be talking about ‘producer sovereignty’, not consumer one. In 
addition, ‘marketing’ scholars explored conditions under which consumers will be more 
inclined to buy (Adner and Zemsky 2006). In addition, Priem (2007) emphasized firm 
ability to create value by engendering ‘consumer benefits experienced’ (p. 219), while Hunt 
(2000) questioned the relevance and even existence of aggregate demand schedules, 
focusing instead on the concept of ‘market offerings’.  
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All the above issues are central to OS and (strategic) management, but are not even 
addressed by the IO ‘competitive model’. This renders it almost superfluous for 
organization scholarship (Makowski and Ostroy 2001). Unfortunately, however, the 
Porterian and transaction-costs focus on ‘strategising’ versus ‘economising’ ( Porter, 1980, 
Williamson, 1991) and the focus of the RBV on concepts borrowed from IO fail to break 
away from the economics straightjacket (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a). It is arguable that a 
new framework is required, more appropriate to OS. We aim to provide such a framework 
in this paper, based what have emerged as the central issues of OS and (strategic) 
management, namely the nature, determinants, causal pathways, trade-offs and co-
evolution of organizational value capture and creation, their relationship to SA – as well as 
vehicles employed by firms to achieve SA - under conditions of uncertainty, change, 
limited rationality and anticipatory-proactive behaviour by economic agents. Despite 
intense recent interest on value capture, value creation and SA by OS and (strategic) 
management scholars, we submit that such a framework is not yet available. 
 
III. Determinants of Firm-level Value Creation and (Strategies for) Value Capture  
  
Determinants of Value Creation by Firms 
Strategy scholarship on value creation did not initially pay much attention to the 
determinants of value (Makadok and Coff 2002; Ramirez 1999). Amit and Zott (2001) 
provide one of the earlier discussions of determinants of value creation. They emphasise 
‘virtual markets’, ‘value chains’, ‘(Schumpeterian) innovation’, intra-firm resources, 
strategic networks and transactions costs economics, as such determinants. More recently, 
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Lepak et al. (2007) emphasize invention and innovation, management and 
entrepreneurship, the creation of advantages and factors underlying such creation (to 
include managerial capabilities and cognition), knowledge creation, learning and 
entrepreneurship, social networks and strategic human resources.  Despite the evident 
progress, that helped establish value creation and capture as canonical themes in strategy, it 
is arguable that the nascent literature on the determinants of value creation can benefit from 
a more systematic analysis. We suggest that such an analysis should distinguish between 
the generic determinants of value, the theories from which these generic determinants 
derive (such as transaction costs, agency, the RBV and property rights) (Kim and Mahoney 
2002; Foss and Foss, 2008), and any vehicles- means through which value creation is 
effected (such as strategic networks). Put differently we submit that the literature so far 
bundles together all three categories and that progress can be made by un-bundling them. 
We propose to do this below by drawing on the relevant economics and management 
scholarship and by focusing on what we claim to be the four generic determinants of value 
creation: innovation, human resources and their services, unit costs economies/returns to 
scale and firm infra-structure and strategy, as well as the theories from which they derive.  
Innovation, first, is arguably the determinant of value par excellence - the primus 
inter pares. ‘Adam Smith (1776), the father figure of economics,  regarded the benefits 
from intrafirm division of labour, teamwork and ‘inventions’ by labourers, engendered 
through learning by doing, as a critical determinant of  productivity and wealth creation 
(Smith 1776, Chapter 1). Marshall (1920) extended Smith’s analysis by identifying 
knowledge as “our most powerful engine of production” (Marshall 1920: 138). 
Schumpeter’s (1942) focus on competition and ‘creative destruction’ highlighted the role of 
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innovation on intertemporal efficiency. The importance of innovation for intertemporal 
efficiency is now acknowledged by mainstream IO economists too (see Baumol 1991, 
2002).  The economics focus is on efficiency and productivity, not value creation as such. 
In strategic management scholarship, however, innovation, knowledge and creative 
destruction have in recent years been linked directly to value creation (Amit and Zott 2001; 
Felin and Hesterly 2007).  
The neoclassical economic theory of growth helps highlight additional generic 
determinants of value. In early contributions, existing technology was considered to be 
embodied in the production function (which includes capital and labour), while 
technological change was seen as very important, but exogenous (Solow 1956). New  
‘endogenous growth’ theories recognized the endogenous nature of technology and 
innovation, the role of increasing returns to scale and the significance of human resources 
such as management, in engendering growth (Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 1988;  Aghion and 
Durlaf 2005). Without always noticing it, such theories build on the ideas of Penrose 
(1959) and earlier contributions by Allyn Young (1928), Kenneth Arrow (1962) and 
Nicholas Kaldor (1970, 1972). While not explicitly couched in terms of value creation and 
despite limitations (see Solow 1997; Loasby 1997), the neoclassical growth theory’s focus 
on ‘returns to scale’, resources (capital and labour) and (its assumptions about) technology, 
provides hints on important additional sources of value creation, notably human resources 
and returns to scale.  
Human resources play a prominent role both in classical economics and in 
management. In Adam Smith, labourers engender productivity enhancement through 
teamwork, learning by doing and inventions. In Karl Marx (1959), the capitalist was the 
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driving force of economic change. The ‘entrepreneur’ and entrepreneurship played this role 
in Schumpeter (1942), in ‘Austrian Economics’ (Ricketts 2002), in the recent literature on 
entrepreneurship (Casson et al. 2006; Alvarez and Barney 2007; Ireland 2007; Foss et al. 
2008) and in strategic human resource management (Becker and Huselid 2006; Kang et al. 
2007). In Penrose (1959) the hero was the ‘manager’ (Pitelis and Wahl 1998). Scholars 
such as Coff (1997) and Pfeffer (1998) underscored the importance of human resources in 
organizations. Human resources are unique and individual and their combination and 
relationships help create the distinct ‘personality’ of the organization (Peteraf 2006) and 
affect the strategy of the organization (Pitelis 2007). In all, it can be argued that the 
quantity, quality and relationship between HR and the services they provide are an 
important determinant of value creation. More recent work by Helfat et al (2007) on 
managerial capabilities and by Kang et al (2007) on HR architectures, links HR specifically 
to organizational value creation. Non-human resources can also be important in the RBV 
especially when they satisfy the VRIN conditions - thereby facilitating value capture.   
Factors that lead to reductions in unit costs (unit costs economies thereafter), 
include economies of scale and scope (Chandler 1962), economies of growth (Penrose 
1959), transaction costs economies (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975), economies of learning 
(Arrow 1962), economies of joint governance (Williamson 2005), external and 
agglomeration economies (Henderson 2005; Kaldor 1970; Krugman 1991, 1996; Porter 
1980), economies of pluralism and diversity (Pitelis 2004b, Mahoney et al. 2009). The 
stronger a firm’s unit cost economies are, the lower will tend to be its unit costs and the 
higher its ability to create value. With the exception of transaction costs (Foss and Foss 
2005), much of the economics literature on unit cost economies has not yet been linked 
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explicitly to value creation per se. However, their impact on unit costs clearly suggests that 
ceteris paribus they help create value and should be seen as generic determinants of value 
creation. 
Absent from economics, but central to strategy is the fourth generic determinant of 
value creation-firm’s infra-structure and strategy. Infra-structure refers to a firm’s systems, 
routines and decision making processes, while structure refers mainly to its internal 
organization (for example, U-form, M-form, heterarchy, etc.). The role of a firm’s systems, 
routines and internal decision making processes and dynamic capabilities, has been 
explored by Cyert and March (1963), Nelson and Winter (1982, 2002), Simon (1995), the 
RBV and the Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) view (Teece et al 1997; Teece 2007). The 
importance of internal organizational forms is discussed by Chandler (1962), Williamson 
(1981), and more recently, among others, Hedlund (1986) and Birkinshaw and Hood 
(1998). The choice of a firm’s internal structure is considered by these authors as being of 
essence in implementing strategy, increasing efficiency and productivity, acquiring and 
upgrading knowledge. 
Strategy is the pursuit of a long-term objective supported by the requisite allocation 
of human and other resources for its implementation (Chandler 1962). The common focus 
on the value capture/profiting from advantages aspect of strategy, underplays the idea that 
strategy is of essence in increasing efficiency by reducing transaction and production costs 
and by increasing perceived value through differentiation (Makadok and Coff 2002). More 
recently, the value creation attributes of strategy have been acknowledged and understood. 
Indeed Ghoshal et al (2002) went as far as prescribing that strategy should focus on value 
creation, not value capture. Firm infra-structure is not usually couched in value creating 
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terms, except in Porter’s (1985) ‘value chain’ analysis. Given, however, its efficiency 
benefits, it is only sensible to consider organizational infra-structure too as a determinant of 
value creation.  
Other potentially growth promoting factors considered in the economic literature 
include physical and financial capital. Physical capital is important in neoclassical growth 
theory, financial in the life cycle hypothesis of saving, (Ando and Modiglani 1963). 
Physical and financial capital are not discussed by economists as determinants of value. It 
is arguable, that by facilitating entrepreneurial investments, these factors help create value. 
However, we propose that their contribution is indirect and operates through the four 
generic variables, especially human resources (Harcourt and Cohen 2003). Similarly, other 
resources (for example raw materials) can be taken to serve as a basis on which value is 
added but they are not independent determinants of value creation (Bowman and Ambrosini 
2000).  
The four proposed generic determinants of value creation interact with each other. 
Human resources are the source of firms’ innovation and strategy. Technology and 
innovation can help reduce unit cost economies. Innovation and technological accumulation 
can be explicit elements of strategy (Cantwell 1989). Firm infra-structure is crucial for the 
implementation of strategy, the leveraging of human resources and technology (Cyert and 
March 1963; Loasby 1998; Nelson and Winter 1982). Unit cost economies enable 
innovation and the leveraging of HR for the undertaking of R&D and innovation (Chandler 
1962). 
The four generic determinants impact on both cost and perceived utility. For 
example, a process innovation can reduce unit costs and engender product differentiation. 
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Infra-structure and strategy can reduce costs (for example through integration) and help 
differentiate the firm itself through branding and business model innovation (Teece 2008). 
Human resources can affect subjective utility through strategy, product differentiation 
and/or innovation. ‘Subjective utility’ and cost reductions, can feed-back to the four generic 
determinants. For example, a firm’s ‘brand’ can help it receive better terms for advertising 
and from suppliers, thus engender unit cost economies.  
In all, the four generic determinants of value creation help reduce costs and effect a 
firm’s unique personality and character, often encapsulated in the complex interactions of 
tacit and codified knowledge, embodied in its ‘business model’ (Chesbourgh and 
Rosenbloom 2002; Teece 2008). These engender ‘firm differentiation’ and can add 
perceived value to consumers. They can also help firms to capture value.  
In Figure 1, we summarize our discussion of the four generic determinants of value 
creation. In the remainder of this section, we focus on strategies for value capture.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Firm-level Strategies for Value Capture 
Capturing value from conjectured value creating advantages, assets and actions is 
arguably the main objective of firms (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995; Teece 1986; 
Teece et al. 1997; Pitelis and Teece 2009). Assuming that a firm possesses an advantage, 
from which it believes it can profit, the fundamental question becomes how to obtain the 
maximum possible net present value (NPV) of the anticipated future income streams of this 
advantage. In addition, the firm has the wider consideration of how to capture the 
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maximum possible value created by other firms and the economy at large.  This is of 
essence to competition (Brandenburger and Stuart 1996, 2001, 2007; MacDonald and Ryall 
2004). Through market power, strategy, ingenuity, imagination and luck, firms try to out-
compete rivals in order to capture value. In general, firms can capture less, equal or more 
value than the one created through their activities (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). The 
size of the pie captured by a firm depends on factors such as barriers to entry (Bain 1956; 
Porter 1980), firm-level ‘generic strategies’, namely cost leadership, differentiation and 
niche strategies (Porter 1985), integration co-operation and diversification strategies 
(Penrose 1959; Chandler 1962; Williamson 1981; Teece 1986), and firm-wide 
differentiation strategies. 
The literature on barriers to entry goes back to Bain (1956), who identified three 
main barriers to entry for new firms, which allow incumbents to capture super-normal 
profits; absolute cost advantages, economies of scale and product differentiation. Bain’s 
empirical work showed that differentiation (or the ‘preference barrier’) was most important. 
Subsequent literature focused on pricing, (Modigliani 1958), investments in excess capacity 
(Spence 1977), product proliferation, and advertising, (Scherer and Ross 1990). Bain and 
the IO did not explicitly link barriers to entry to value capture, focusing instead on the 
related theme of price determination. Strategy scholars such as Porter (1980), built on Bain 
and the IO and made this link explicit.  A limitation of this perspective is that it focuses on 
the level of the industry, not the firm. 
Firm-level ‘generic strategies’ such as ‘cost leadership’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘focus’ 
or ‘niche’, on the other hand, focus on the firm level and have been explicitly couched in 
terms of value capture (Porter 1985). They allow firms to position themselves in a sector, 
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so as to capture value by reducing the forces of competition. On the other hand, integration, 
diversification and cooperation strategies aim to capture value, either through efficiency, 
for example in the transaction costs literature (Foss and Foss 2005), or through market 
power for example in Bain (1956) and Porter (1980). The two are often linked. For 
example, firms can often obtain market power through the successful implementation of 
transaction costs reduction - motivated integration strategies (Pitelis 1991). 
Penrose (1959) discussed both Bain-type barriers to entry, and intra-firm barriers, 
which she termed technological or ‘relatively impregnable bases’ (Penrose 1959: 137). 
These represent a package of skills, competences, innovation, capabilities and advantages 
that distinguish them from other firms and allow them to grow by diversification by 
building  on strength (Pitelis 2004a and below).  
Hard to imitate intra-firm resources and capabilities, as well as ‘relatively 
impregnable bases’ and the overall ‘business model’ (Chesbourgh and Rosenbloom 2002; 
Teece 2008), can also help shape a firm’s “distinct identity” (Peteraf 2006; Peteraf and 
Shanley 1997; Richardson 1998), therefore engender a ‘firm differentiation’ barrier to 
entry. This can serve as a value capture strategy.  
The four types of value capture strategies interact. From Bain’s three barriers, two 
relate to Porter’s generic strategies (cost leadership and differentiation). Integration, 
cooperation and diversification strategies are often viewed as barriers to entry (Porter 
1980). They also impact on ‘firm differentiation’ as they help determine a firm’s ‘business 
model’-distinct identity.  
In their interactions, the four types of strategies for value capture are also linked to 
value creation. Bain’s cost and differentiation barriers and Porter’s generic strategies help 
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reduce unit costs and/or increase perceived value. Intra-firm barriers, ‘relatively 
impregnable bases’ and the ‘business model’ help firms create potential value through 
‘branding’. Integration strategies help create value by reducing transaction costs (Foss and 
Foss 2005). Even Bain-type barriers can help create potential value, by providing an 
incentive to potential entrants thereby engendering Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. 
This interaction points to the possible co-determination and co-evolution between value 
capture and value creation, which we explore below.  
Some of the above relationships have been formalised in the context of game 
theoretic models (Brandenburger and Stuart 2003; MacDonald and Ryall 2004). The latter 
derive conditions under which strategy (such as capacity choices) competition and value 
creation, can help firms to capture value, taking value creation opportunities as given 
(MacDonald and Ryall 2004: 1324). The authors acknowledge the restrictive assumption 
and results of their game theoretic framework, critically the assumption that all agents have 
the same perceptions of value. It is arguable that this denies the very notion of 
entrepreneurship, which is based on subjectivism (Lipman and Rumelt 2003b, Foss et al 
2008). This provides an additional reason why, without denying the usefulness of formal 
theorising for its purposes and uses, we adopt below an appreciative, theory-based co-
evolutionary perspective. Further important reasons for doing so are discussed in the next 
section.  
An implication from our analysis is that organizational innovation, in its 
conventional sense, as for example R&D, is not necessary for a firm to capture value. Firms 
like IBM, Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Sun and Oracle can capture value through strategy 
without any additional innovation advantages (Chesbourgh 2003). Looked differently, such 
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firms are innovative in devising strategies for value capture; which are therefore value 
creating-value capture strategies. Importantly, technology and innovation can be seen as 
part and parcel of a value capture strategy. Strategy itself is a potentially value creating 
‘advantage’ from which firms can capture value, so as to obtain SAs. Clearly not all 
advantages lead to improved performance. In addition to competition, this will depend in 
part on stakeholder bargaining power (Coff 1999; Lippman and Rumelt 2003), the type of 
human capital and HR practices (Bowman and Swart 2007; Coff 1997) and the extent of 
intra-organizational conflict (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Pitelis 2007). It will also depend 
on the relative mix and potential trade-offs between value creation and capture strategies 
discussed below. 
 
Value Creation - Value Capture Trade-Offs 
Despite their interrelationship, some value-based strategies are almost exclusively 
concerned with value capture - such as strategic entry deterrence and monopolistic 
restrictions (Penrose 1959). Others, like explorative innovations (March 1991), such as 
EMI’s CT scanner, focus more on value creation. In this context there are likely to be trade-
offs between value capture and value creation strategies (much like in March’s (1991) 
exploration and exploitation strategies). In particular, it could be argued that at any given 
point in time, resources allocated in pursuing value capture, may be taken away from 
resources required for value creation (for example explorative innovation), see Mizik and 
Jacobson (2003), and vice versa. It is also arguable that the pursuit of value creation versus 
capture may require different types of knowledge and capabilities (Loasby 1998). This 
helps explain why some firms (such as EMI) were more successful in creating value, some 
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others (like Apple), in capturing value. Arguably, the successful management of this trade-
off is of the essence of firm strategy and performance. Too much focus on value capture 
today may undermine long-term success, too much focus on value creation, may deprive an 
organization from the means to compete and thus keep creating value.  
The above calls for ambidexterity, and the need for organizational structures, 
divisions of labour and vehicles that can engender value creation and value capture, 
exploration and exploitation (Smith and Tushman 2005), simultaneously and 
intertemporally. In turn this too invites a co-evolutionary analysis of the relationship 
between value creation and capture, under real world conditions of change, uncertainty, 
limited rationality, learning and anticipatory and proactive behavior, as well as their link to 
organizational SA. This is our focus in the next section.   
 
IV. Co-evolution and Co-determination of Value Creation and Capture and (Vehicles 
for) Organizational SA 
 
In real life conditions, economic agents operate in a context of uncertainty, often 
radical (one where no probabilities can be assigned on expected future outcomes, Knight 
1921) and change. Moreover, agents are not globally rational, but instead possess limited, 
bounded and/or procedural rationality (Simon 1995; Loasby 1996). In this context, agents 
are unlikely to hold the same perceptions of value, let alone them being able to identify the 
optimal mix between value creation and capture that will lead to SA. Instead they try to do 
as best as they can under the circumstances, as well as to change the circumstances to 
facilitate the realization of their choices as far as possible. For example, firms may not go 
for profit maximization at a given point in time (short run) but pursue other objectives such 
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as growth and market share (Marris 2002). This is because they may believe that by so 
doing they will be in a stronger position to achieve long-term profits (Best 1990), or 
because the process of growth itself is endogenous in firms (Penrose 1959). For Richardson 
(1998) the presence of uncertainty and divergent beliefs about the chance of success is of 
the essence to the competitive process- as it fuels creativity, (and, we might add, risk 
taking). Such issues are largely unexplored in the still nascent literature on value creation 
and capture, while game theoretic models mostly abstract from such divergence (Lippman 
and Rumelt 2003b; MacDonald and Ryall 2004). 
Another limitation of extant literature is the absence of discussion of the causal 
pathways through which value is created and captured. In what follows, we try to fill these 
gaps by bringing together our analysis of conjectured and realized value and our discussion 
on value capture, in order to identify causal pathways between the two, explore their 
potential co-evolution and co-determination  and identify potential vehicles through which 
firms try to capture and create value intertemporally and simultaneously in order to achieve 
SA. We do so in terms of Figure 2. 
Figure 2 around here 
 In Figure 2 we portray an aspiring principal-entrepreneur (or a team thereof), who 
conjecture that they possess advantages or capabilities that could create appropriable value 
to end users, from which they can themselves capture as much as possible. Their choice is 
to sell the advantage or capability in the market, or to create an organization that allows 
them to build the product or service, and then sell it to end users. At this stage, value 
creation is conjectured or imagined. It only exists in the mind of the economic agents in 
question, as an ‘image’ (Penrose, 1959). In the case these agents can sell the advantage or 
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capability in the market at what they perceive to be a satisfactory price, they realize 
automatically the conjectured-imagined value. By capturing value they translate conjecture 
to reality. Value creation and value capture at the level of the chosen unit of analysis 
coexist. This case is more akin to commerce or licensing. Its realization will depend on the 
degree of existence of complete and perfect, present and future markets. 
In the event the agents in question believe there is no market for their 
ideas/advantages, namely when markets are thin or inexistent, especially likely in the case 
of intangible assets and ideas, and/or that they can capture more value by creating an 
organization to produce and sell the product or service, they may decide to do so (Pitelis 
and Teece 2009). The existence of the organization may also help its members to capture 
value created by others, such as suppliers, customers, and distributors, who may help co-
create value by appreciating (‘valuing’) and/or improving and promoting the product or 
service in question. This for example, can be the case when other organizations  develop 
assets complementary to the value creating organization in question (Teece 1986). 
Similarly, the value from an organization’s advantages can be captured and/or improved 
upon by other competitors. While at each level of analysis total value created also equals 
total value captured, at each individual organization’s level it is quite possible and indeed 
likely that more or less value is captured from the ideas, advantages, capabilities and value 
co-created by the organization in question and/or by others. Under uncertainty and limited 
rationality, it is not possible to predict or even guess-estimate the potential for value capture 
and creation of any original ideas, not least because the potential and extent of value co-
creation is both unknown and partly endogenous to entrepreneurial action. In this context 
the next best thing organizations can hope to do is create the preconditions that will allow 
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them to compete in the market place from a position of relative strength, that is co-create 
markets, value and prices, so as to capture as much of it as possible (Pitelis and Teece 
2009). In the case of an aspiring entrepreneur, this could often involve the creation of an 
organization -firm that helps them do so (Pitelis 2005). 
In the scheme above, causality goes from conjectured or imagined value creation to 
realised value creation, directly or through the setting up of an organization. In our analysis, 
conjectured-imagined value creation causes organization, value capture strategies and in 
turn realised value creation, thus value capture. As, however, value created is only realised 
as value captured, value capture capabilities can in turn interact with, and help create, 
value. In addition, value capture capabilities can help capture value created by others. In 
this sense, value creation and capture are co-determined and co-evolving. The conjecture of 
a value creating advantage, the potential value of which is perceived as appropriable, 
motivates the setting-up of an organization that can help realize the conjectured and co-
created value, by co-creating markets thus prices and by valorising its offerings. The 
process of social market co-creation therefore aids firm’s pursuit of private appropriation, 
which is effected through the adoption of value capture strategies.         
The complex interrelationship between different types of value capture and value 
creation strategies, and the absence of full knowledge and rationality, makes it all but 
impossible for organizations to select an ‘optimal’ value capture strategy at any given point 
in time. In the context of uncertainty and limited rationality, therefore, an important 
question is how best can an organization go about capturing value intertemporally, or what 
‘vehicles’ it may deploy to do so. Such ‘vehicles’ could combine elements of the value 
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capture strategies we discussed, yet allow firms to change their mix over time, depending 
on their shifting ‘productive opportunity’. 
Penrose’s concept of  ‘relatively impregnable bases’ provides such an example, 
which moreover is akin to more recent developments by Teece (1986), and the RBV 
pertaining to innovation, firm heterogeneity, the need for appropriability, complementary 
assets and capabilities and the role of  dynamic capabilities in allowing firms to sustain 
their advantages (Teece 2007). In Penrose’s words: 
 “In the long run the profitability, survival, and growth of a firm does not depend so 
much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the production of even a 
widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability of the firm to establish 
one or more wide and relatively impregnable ‘bases’ from which it can adapt and 
extend it operations in an uncertain, changing and competitive world” (p. 137 – 
emphasis added). 
Penrose (1960) provided an example in her case study of the Hercules Powder 
Company. While Hercules’ original focus was on explosives, it gradually developed 
competencies in chemistry, customer relationships and reputation that allowed it to 
diversify, by building on the strength of such advantages and capabilities that were difficult 
for competitors to match. When Hercules accidentally came up with a new chemical 
substance, called CMC, with potential applications outside explosives, it adopted a highly 
innovative approach which involved advertising the characteristics of CMC in the national 
press and asking the question “what do you see in CMC?”. This allowed the company to 
exploit dispersed knowledge and diversify in other activities by building on its ‘relatively 
impregnable base’ to capture value from its new (and old) advantages. In this example 
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Hercules combined firm differentiation with cost leadership, careful dealing with potential 
competitors (entry deterrence) and VRIN-type intra-firm resources and capabilities – all 
built around a single technological-relatively impregnable base-‘platform’.  
‘Relatively impregnable bases’, (as well as ‘routines’ and ‘dynamic capabilities’, 
Nelson and Winter 1982; Helfat et al. 2007) can therefore be seen as vehicles through 
which firms try to marry over time stability and change, diversity and direction, equilibrium 
and growth (Loasby 1996; Richardson 2002). ‘Relatively impregnable bases’ can allow 
firms to capture value, but also to create value by building on such bases.  
 Recent work on industry architectures (Jacobides et al. 2006) is complementary to 
that of ‘relatively impregnable bases’, in that the control of ‘industry architectures’ can help 
engender ‘relatively impregnable bases’ for incumbents. This idea can be extended to 
‘system-integration’ advantages possessed by large multinational firms as well as to the 
concept of ‘business model innovation’ (Teece 2008). Such vehicles can also be employed 
in order to help firms shape their productive opportunity so this is better aligned to the 
shifting and partly endogenous to the firm’s actions environmental conditions.  
 
It is arguable that some firms can be ‘too successful’ in building ‘impregnable 
bases’. Large companies, like Google and Microsoft, are sometimes accused for failing to 
pursue exploratory innovations, because their relative ‘impregnability’ is strong enough for 
them to be able to stem the forces of creative destruction and affords them the luxury to 
focus on exploitation-value capture. This can create a dissonance between organizational 
SA and system-wide sustainable value creation, eventually undermining the very 
sustainability of organizational advantage. The recent crisis is a case in point and has led to 
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calls for regulatory policy on the part of government and/or requisite action by the civic 
society at large to promote economic sustainability (Mahoney et al. 2009). 
 To summarize, in the real world of uncertainty, change, limited and procedural 
rationality, learning, and the pursuit of adaptative and proactive actions, based on 
anticipatory behavior as well as attempts to mould their  ‘productive opportunity’, is a way 
through which firms try to survive, evolve and succeed in a shifting landscape.. In this 
context value creation and value capture are co-determined and co-evolve. A way to 
capture value and effect SA in such a context is by co-creating markets, value, and prices, 
so as more socially created value becomes available for private appropriation. Value 
capture strategies as well as vehicles such as ‘relatively impregnable’ (albeit evolving) 
bases, allow firms to appropriate as much value as possible.  
 
V. Conclusions. Managerial Practice, Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
The purpose of this paper was to make progress towards providing a novel 
framework for organization and management scholarship, better suited for its purposes than 
the economics market-based IO approach. While the purpose of the last mentioned is to 
analyze price determination under restrictive benchmark assumptions, the focus of 
management and OS is to appreciate the nature, determinants and co-evolution of 
organizations, their structure, performance and impact on their wider environment. We 
suggested that a framework that explores the nature, determinants, trade-offs, causal 
pathways and co-evolution and co-determination between value capture and creation, and 
their relationship to organizational SA, under conditions of uncertainty, change, limited 
rationality, learning, adaptive and proactive behaviour, can help serve this purpose.  
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In addition to the above main objective, our analysis extended extant literature on 
value creation and capture in the following ways. First, we provided a novel, more general 
definition of value and value creation, distinguished between conjectured and realised value 
creation and observed the coincidence of value creation and value capture at the individual 
unit level. Second, we discussed the generic determinants of value creation in a more 
systematic and discriminating way than hitherto available. Third, we discussed the major 
strategies for value capture and proposed the novel concept-strategy of ‘firm-
differentiation’, which is more consistent with current research in the RBV tradition. 
Fourth, we discussed potential trade-offs between value creation and capture and their 
relationship to firm-level SA. Fifth, we analysed causal pathways of value creation and 
capture, and their interrelationships, co-evolution and co-determination in the context of an 
uncertain, path-dependent environment, limited rationality and learning. Sixth, we proposed 
that value is being co-created and that market and thus price creation and co-creation is a 
fundamental way through which firms can enhance the overall pie and capture as much as 
possible of the socially co-created value. Seventh, we discussed vehicles through which 
firms can aim to achieve SA in such contexts, notably that of developing ‘relatively 
impregnable bases’, as well as business and system integration architectures.   
In terms of managerial practice, our analysis suggests that firm-level SA can be 
effected through the pursuit of innovation at all levels, to include market and value creation 
and co-creation, as well as value capture capabilities and strategies and the intertemporal 
management of the trade-offs between value creation and capture, that can be effected 
through the building of ‘relatively impregnable bases’. All these require both generic and 
firm-specific entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities which are not only unavailable in 
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extant markets but importantly precede, and are critical for, the co-creation of markets, 
prices and value (Pitelis and Teece 2009).  
 The strength of our analysis, lies in that it provides a framework and answers to 
some of the most generic and existential concerns of OS and strategic management 
scholarship. This is also a limitation and opportunity for further research. In terms of 
limitations, our framework and analysis involves multiple interacting categories that can 
benefit from further elaboration, modelling, testing and extensions.   An indicative list of 
examples includes the following questions. Are all determinants of value creation and 
capture equally important?  Does the role of determinants change over time and how? Are 
all types of the constituents of the various determinants (for instance different types of HR, 
of innovation, of unit cost economies and of firm infra-structure) equally important and 
does this change over time? Is the relationship between the various determinants and their 
constituents equally strong and significant? Importantly, what is their exact relationship and 
how does this evolve and/or is moderated by other factors. How testable are our proposed 
ideas and framework and whether and what type of evidence can be marshalled to test and 
support or reject some of our ideas?  
The above and many other questions that emerge from our analysis, are also 
opportunities for further research.  Three lines of such research that we currently pursue are 
as follows. First is the role of value capture on the nature of the firm, namely why and how 
firms emerge in market economies. Second is the adoption of formal models to derive exact 
relationships (such as intra-firm conflict management and the type of innovation most 
appropriate for value capture), under specific assumptions. Third is the empirical testing of 
the determinants of value creation and capture in real firms and industries through the 
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collection and use of primary data. In addition to our own efforts, much of the current 
research undertaken in OS and strategy has direct implications for our framework, despite 
the fact that it is not motivated by it.  Our hope is that our research will help provide an 
alternative lens to that of IO and that it will motivate others to undertake similar, related 
and complementary critical work on these important issues, by adopting this lens as more 
appropriate for OS scholars. 
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Figure 1. Four generic determinants of value creation 
 
 
• Figure 1, summarizes the four generic and interacting determinants of value creation 
at the level of the firm 
- Other factors or subfactors can affect value creation, through their effect on the four 
generic determinants 
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Figure 2. The process and causal pathways of value creation and capture 
 
• In Figure 2 Conjectured Value Creating Advantages cause (the pursuit of) value 
capture, either through direct sale (such as licensing in the case of perfect markets) or 
through the setting-up of an organization in the case of market failure – perceived need 
for market creation and co-creation. 
− Organization helps transform conjectured to realised value by developing value 
capture strategies, not available in the market. Such strategies help organizations 
also capture co-created value.  
− A vehicle for firms to achieve SA under uncertainty, change and limited rationality 
is the building of ‘relatively impregnable bases’.  
 
 
 
Generic Determinants of 
Value Creation 
 
Competition and 
Cooperation, Market and 
Value Co-creation  
 
Value Capture Strategies 
– “Relatively 
Impregnable Bases” 
 
 
    Organization - Firm 
 
 
Conjectured Value-
Creating 
Advantages 
 
Sale of Product or 
Service, Realised 
Value 
